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NO ANGELS IN ACADEME: ENDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERENCE TO PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION
WILLIAM E. THRO*
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself. —James Madison1
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1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). Madison’s views on the nature of
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution reflects a Calvinist perspective2—a fundamental
distrust of humans and human institutions.3 Neither the People nor the
People’s Agents are angels;4 they are flawed individuals who will pursue

2. As Mark David Hall demonstrated, Calvinist theology (sometimes called reformed
theology) was one of the foundations of the Constitution. MARK DAVID HALL, ROGER
SHERMAN AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 12-40 (2013). This is not to
discount the influence of Locke or Montesquieu, but simply to acknowledge the Framing
Generation had great awareness of the Calvinist thread of the Protestant tradition. As Hall
explained, “American leaders were familiar with Locke, but few thought his political
philosophy was at odds with traditional Christian or Calvinist political ideas.” Id. at 24.
Rather, “Locke’s political philosophy is best understood as a logical extension of Protestant
resistance literature rather than as a radical departure from it.” Id. at 21.
3. As Professor Hamilton explained:
One of the dominating themes of Calvin’s theology is the fundamental distrust
of human motives, beliefs, and actions. On Calvin’s terms, there is never a
moment in human history when that which is human can be trusted blindly as
a force for good. Humans may try to achieve good, but there are no tricks, no
imaginative role-playing, and no social organizations that can guarantee the
generation of good. . . . Thus, Calvinism counsels in favor of diligent
surveillance of one’s own and other’s actions, and it also presupposes the value
of the law (both biblical and secular) to guide human behavior away from its
propensity to do wrong.
Marci Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the Constitutional
Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSP. ON LEGAL THOUGHT 189, 189 (Michael W. McConnell,
Robert F. Corchran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella, eds., 2001).
4. In contrast, those who advocated for a new European Constitution viewed
humanity as inherently good. See GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL (2005).
Robert Keegan has suggested that the foreign policy disputes between the United States and
Europe are a product of different perspectives on humanity. See ROBERT KEEGAN, OF
PARADISE AND POWER (2003).
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self-interest, abuse power, and engage in corruption.5 The Constitution
protects the liberty of the People—individually and collectively—from the
People’s Agents and the ever-shifting political winds.6 Instead of an allpowerful national government,7 the Constitution “split the atom of
sovereignty . . . establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”8 Rather than
combining executive, legislative, and judicial power in a single parliament
dominated by the majority party of the day, 9 the Constitution “protects us
from our own best intentions” by preventing the concentration of “power in
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”10 Because
“all . . . are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain
unalienable rights,”11 the Constitution “withdraws certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy” and “places them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials.”12
When the Will of the People’s Agents as expressed in the statutes or
executive actions contradicts the Will of the People as expressed in the

5. See R.C. SPROUL, WILLING TO BELIEVE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER FREE WILL 5255 (1997).
6. See RANDY BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY &
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
7. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
8. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
9. South Africa’s Constitution illustrates this point. First, Constitutional Court—the
highest judicial body—is commanded to “promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
Second, a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly can amend most provisions of the
Constitution at any time. Id. If one party holds more than two-thirds of the seats—a common
occurrence during the first two decades of multi-racial democracy—revision of the nation’s
fundamental law can be accomplished by a single political party. Id. Third, the National
Assembly—the legislature—is elected by proportional representation, which allows parties with
low levels of support to obtain seats. Id. Fourth, because the President is the leader of the party
or the coalition that has a majority in the National Assembly, there is neither a legislative check
on the executive nor an executive check on the legislature. See id. Fifth, although South Africa is
nominally a federation, the individual provinces are subordinate to the will of the National
Government, which, as explained above, is controlled by democratic majorities. See id.
Of course, South Africa does have a comprehensive Bill of Rights and the Constitutional
Court vigorously enforces those rights. Indeed, the Constitutional Court invalidated the initial
Constitution. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4)
SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.). However, this judicial check is the only real check on the power of a
democratic majority. For South Africa, the Bill of Rights creates limits on government rather
than merely confirming the limits that are implicit in the structure. In that sense, South Africa is
fundamentally different from the Augustinian vision embodied in the United States Constitution.
10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
11. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. W. Va State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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Constitution,13 then the judiciary must ensure that the Constitution prevails.14
Because judicial review is inherently anti-democratic15 and because judges
are flawed humans16 who also need to be limited,17 the judiciary must apply
the original public meaning of the constitutional text18 or, when such an
interpretation is inconclusive, a constitutional construction consistent with
the original public meaning.19 Judicial review must recognize constitutional
actors are humans, not angels; there must be doubt, not deference.20 Although
there have been occasions or even eras when the Court has failed the

13. Although we frequently say that a statute or executive action violates the
Constitution, only constitutional actors—human beings—can violate the Constitution. A
claim that a statute violates the Constitution is really a claim that the legislature violated the
Constitution. A claim that an executive action violates the Constitution is really a claim that
a particular executive branch official violated the Constitution. See Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010); Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); see also
William E. Thro, Rosenkranz’ Constitutional Subjects & School Finance Litigation, 260 ED.
LAW REP. 1 (2010) (applying Rosenkranz’ theory to school finance litigation).
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
15. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
4 (1982).
16. Recognizing the dangers of rule by a “bevy of platonic guardians,” Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1958)), judges are not “omni-compete[nt]” and, thus, cannot micromanage
government departments. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536
(7th Cir. 1997).
17. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989). See also RALPH ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION
27-29 (2006).
18. While originalism offers the best method of restraint, its effectiveness ultimately
depends upon the willingness of the judge to be restrained. If a judge wishes to refrain from
imposing his policy views, then adhering to originalism is one way—the best way—to reach
that result. Will Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
19. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
20. For an analysis of these contrasting approaches in the context of a state
constitutional challenge to a school finance system, see William E. Thro & Carlee Poston
Escue, Doubt or Deference: Comparing the South Dakota and Washington School Finance
Decisions, 281 EDUC. L. REP. 771 (2012).
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Republic,21 the Court generally has enforced the division of sovereignty, 22
the separation of powers,23 and the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.24
Yet, with respect to academe, a different constitutional paradigm
prevails. In the view of the judiciary, higher education administrators are
“angels”—entitled to greater deference than constitutional actors in other
spheres.25 For example, constitutional actors in academe may: (1) utilize
racial classifications for different purposes and with far greater deference; 26
(2) force religious groups to admit those who disagree with the group’s basic
faith tenets;27 and (3) impose life-altering punishments with little due process
protections.28

21. While there is general agreement that the Court has failed in its role, there is
profound disagreement as to which cases or eras represent failure. The landmark beacon of
liberty for some is a constitutional betrayal for others.
22. Because “the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure
and plays too vital a role in securing freedom,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578
(1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring), the Court has intervened to
maintain the sovereign prerogatives of both the States and the National Government. In
order to preserve the sovereignty of the National Government, the Court has prevented the
States from imposing term limits on members of Congress, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 800-01 (1995), and instructing members of Congress as to how to vote on
certain issues, Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 519-22, (2001). Similarly, it has invalidated
state laws that infringe on the right to travel, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), undermine
the Nation’s foreign policy, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74
(2000), and exempt a State from generally applicable regulations of interstate commerce,
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000). Conversely, recognizing that “the erosion of
state sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a time,” South Carolina v. Baker 485 U.S. 505,
533 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has declared that the National
Government may not compel the States to pass particular legislation, New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992), require state officials to enforce federal law, Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), dictate the location of the State Capitol, Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911), or regulate purely local matters, United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3.
23. “The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws
enacted by Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,’ personally and through officers whom he appoints. . . .” Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
Thus, Congress may not interfere with the President’s enforcement of the law, see
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and the President
may not interfere with Congress’ ability to legislate. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998).
24. Although various justices have disagreed as to exactly how the Bill of Rights
applies to the States, the Court has found that virtually all of the Bill of Rights applies to the
States. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759-61 (2010).
25. To be sure, there are some contexts—notably the Freedom of Speech—where the
judiciary treats higher education administrators in the same manner as other constitutional
actors. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(holding that public university violated First Amendment by excluding religious publication
from university’s funding mechanism).
26. See infra Part I(A).
27. See infra Part I(B).
28. See infra Part I(C).
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This Article’s thesis is simple—because public university
administrators are no more angelic than other constitutional actors are, the
judiciary’s deference to higher education officials must end. There is no
reason for greater deference to the academy than to other governmental units.
Instead, judges must subject higher education administrators to the same
skepticism and doubt as other constitutional actors.
This Article has three parts. Part I examines how the Courts treat
academe’s constitutional actors more deferentially than constitutional actors
in other spheres. Specifically, it discusses different approaches concerning
racial preferences, student religious groups’ freedom of association, and due
process for students facing life-altering penalties. Part II details the
consequences of the judiciary’s unwarranted deference to higher education.
Racial preferences have significant costs, frequently do not help
disadvantaged students, and are not necessary to the achievement of racial
diversity. Forcing religious groups to admit non-believers undermines
Confident Pluralism. Diminishing due process protections does nothing to
help sexual assault victim-survivors. Part III details the possibility of ending
this judicial deference to higher education through state constitutional
provisions, federal statutory or regulatory changes, or overruling existing
Supreme Court precedents. In particular, it explores the likelihood racial
preferences in higher education will be treated the same as racial preferences
in other context, student religious groups will have the associational rights as
religious organizations outside of academe, and due process protections will
be enhanced.
I.
A.

THE JUDICIARY’S DEFERENCE TO HIGHER EDUCATION
OFFICIALS
Racial Preferences in Admissions

The Equal Protection Clause,29 is “essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike,”30 and that the Constitution
protects “persons, not groups.”31 Indeed, the “rights created by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.
The rights established are personal rights.”32 If a program treats everyone
equally, there is no equal protection violation.33 The “general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original);
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986).
32. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (emphasis omitted).
33. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (restating that the Equal Protection
Clause enforces the principle that the Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among its
citizens).
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drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”34 This
general rule gives way in those rare instances when statutes infringe upon
fundamental constitutional rights or utilize “suspect” or “quasi-suspect”
classifications.35
“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged
by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”36
Indeed, because racial distinctions “are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality”37 and
are “contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect,”38 “all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny.”39 The government’s desire to use racial classifications to help
racial minorities does not alter the analysis.40 Indeed, the Court has “insisted
on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial
classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, racebased preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting
intended to improve minority representation.”41 Instead of presuming that
governmental action is constitutional42 and requiring the challenger to
demonstrate otherwise,43 “the government has the burden of proving that
racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.’”44
Outside of the higher education context, there is only one compelling
interest that would justify the use of race—remedying the present day effects
of identified past intentional racial discrimination by a particular
governmental unit.45 Just as significantly, the Court has rejected, as a matter
of constitutional law, a number of other justifications offered by state and
local governments for race-conscious measures: maintaining a racial balance
in K-12 education,46 remedying societal discrimination,47 and providing
34. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230
(1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
35. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
36. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
37. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
38. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (citing Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100).
39. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
40. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 (1982).
41. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
42. Lyng v. Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988).
43. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).
44. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504-05 (1989).
46. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 72021 (2007) (citations omitted).
47. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
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minority K-12 students with faculty role models.48 If the government asserts
there are present day effects of past intentional discrimination, there must be
specific findings49 of actual present-day effects of past discrimination.50
Although the findings of legislative bodies are generally entitled to great
deference,51 a racial classification cannot rest on a generalized assertion that
discrimination exists in society or in a particular agency.52 Because the
concept of underrepresentation “rests upon the ‘completely unrealistic’
assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion
to their representation in the local population,”53 underrepresentation or
disparity is not sufficient to establish “a strong basis in evidence” for present
effects of racial discrimination that would permit an agency to take raceconscious action to fashion a remedy consistent with the Constitution.54 Instead,
there must be “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental
unit involved. . . .”55 Findings of discrimination cannot be extrapolated from
one governmental unit to another.56 Nor can findings of discrimination
against one racial group be extrapolated to other racial groups.57 The
judiciary rarely upholds governmental racial classifications.58 When it
permits racial classification, the judiciary insists that the racial classification
end once the government has eliminated the present day effects of the past
discrimination.59
48. Id. at 275-76.
49. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11.
50. Id. at 500.
51. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
52. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964).
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
54. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976); Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educ. Equity League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974). Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“If our society is to continue to progress as a
multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes
retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.”).
55. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (emphasis added).
56. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508. See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995);
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
57. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (“The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a
practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination . . . suggests that perhaps
the . . . purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.”).
58. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Additionally, the Court has
approved—indeed required—the use of racial classifications in K-12 education as a means of
remedying the present day effects of previous de jure discrimination within the school district.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Meckenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1971).
59. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 744,
(2007). For a commentary on the higher education implications of the case, see Charles J.
Russo & William E. Thro, Higher Education Implications of Parents Involved for Community
Schools, 35 J. C. & U. L. 239 (2009). For a case reaching a similar result that foreshadowed the
Supreme Court’s decision, see Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274
(D. Colo. 1995); Keyes v. Sch. District No. 1, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding
Colorado Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of race in student assignments).
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Yet, in the context of higher education, a different paradigm prevails.
First, although other governmental entities may only pursue racial
classifications as a means of remedying the present day effects of past
intentional discrimination by the governmental entity, public universities
have an additional compelling governmental interest—obtaining the
educational benefits of a diverse student body in higher education.60 Second,
governmental findings of present day effects of past intentional
discrimination receive severe skepticism, but “the decision to pursue ‘the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity’ . . . is, in
substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete,
judicial deference is proper.”61 Third, while the Court insists “[t]he higher
education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring analysis of strict
scrutiny applicable in other contexts,”62 its most recent decision suggests
merely invoking “the educational benefits of diversity” is sufficient and that
it need not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether
its plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.63 Fourth,
although the Court suggested in 2003 there would no need to use race to
achieve diversity after 2028,64 higher education’s pursuit of diversity seems
to have no logical endpoint.
B.

Freedom of Association for Student Religious Groups

The right to express a particular viewpoint necessarily includes the
right to associate with others who share that view. “An individual’s freedom
to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State
60. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003). Despite what many
administrators may think, the Court’s embrace of “diversity” is “not an interest in simple
ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed
to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315
(1978). “Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a
compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’” Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 732 (2007).
61. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I]
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). A university cannot impose a fixed quota or otherwise
“define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its
race or ethnic origin.’” Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307). Once, however, a university
gives “a reasoned, principled explanation” for its decision, deference must be given “to the
University’s conclusion, based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student body
would serve its educational goals.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208
(2016) [hereinafter Fisher II] (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
62. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
63. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
not also guaranteed.”65 “This right is crucial in preventing the majority from
imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
unpopular, ideas.”66 “If the government were free to restrict individuals’
ability to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the
First Amendment is intended to protect.”67 This freedom of association “is
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”68
“Freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.”69 “Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if
associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share
the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s being.”70 “The
forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints.”71
Therefore, government may intrude on the freedom of association
only “by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to
the suppression of ideas that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.”72 Courts are required to “examine
whether or not the application of the state law would impose any ‘serious
burden’ on the organization’s rights of expressive association.”73 Judges
“give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its
expression” and “to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression.”74 It is not necessary for the organization’s core purpose to be
expressive or for all members to agree with all aspects of the message. 75
Under this framework, the Court has upheld statutes requiring civic
organizations to admit women,76 but has allowed both parade organizers77
and the Boy Scouts to exclude homosexuals. 78 The cases have turned on

65. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
66. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000).
67. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006).
68. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
69. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
70. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22
(1981); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574-75 (2000).
71. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
72. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
73. Dale, 530 U.S. at 685.
74. Id. at 653.
75. Id. at 655.
76. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1987);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-27.
77. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
572-73 (1995).
78. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-60.
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whether the “the enforcement of these [policies]” would “materially interfere
with the ideas that the organization sought to express.”79
While all groups enjoy these constitutional rights to exclude those
who disagree with the groups’ objectives,80 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC recognized that the First Amendment
“gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot
accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say
about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own [leaders].”81 “By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments.”82 “According the state the power to determine
which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment
Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical
decisions.”83
Hosanna-Tabor establishes that religious groups have a right of
absolute discretion to determine who their leaders will be. Logically, if an
organization can restrict its leadership to those who adhere to the faith and
basic principles, then the organization ought to be able to impose a similar
requirement on membership. Consequently, the necessary inference of
Hosanna-Tabor is that religious organizations, through the Religion
Clauses,84 have greater associational freedoms than their secular counterparts
do.85
Yet, in higher education, a different paradigm prevails. In Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez,86 a sharply divided Supreme Court held that
officials at a public institution in California might require a student religious
group to admit all-comers from the student body, including those who
disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of being a recognized student
organization.87 Put another way, the Court declared that the government,
79. Id. at 657.
80. The government may not require organizations to surrender this right as a
condition of participating in a grant program or receiving some benefit. See Agency for Int’l
Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013).
81. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
189 (2012).
82. Id. at 188.
83. Id. at 188-89.
84. “Responding somewhat incredulously to the government’s theory that whatever
rights the church might have derive only from freedom of association, [Justice Scalia] said
that ‘there, black on white in the text of the Constitution are special protections for
religion.’” Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 839, 855 (2012).
85. Because the government may favor religion and religious entities over nonreligion and non-religious entities, such a result would not violate the Establishment Clause.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-24 (2005); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
86. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
87. Id. at 669.
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through university officials, might force religious groups to choose between
compromising their values and receiving benefits that other student groups
receive as a matter of constitutional right. While the government “surely
could not demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe that
Jesus was merely human,”88 the government “may impose these very same
requirements on students who wish to participate in a forum that is designed
to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints.”89 As Professor Paulsen notes,
the “holding is a fundamental negation of the right of Christian campus
groups to freedom of speech, to freedom of association, and to the collective
free exercise of religion—a First Amendment disaster trifecta.”90
C.

Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings

Unlike the legal traditions of other cultures, the Anglo-AmericanAustralasian legal tradition has required procedural due process before
government deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.91 “Due
process is the foundation of any system of justice that seeks a fair outcome.
Due process either protects everyone or it protects no one.”92 Due process
prevents arbitrary governmental action,93 but it is ultimately a search for
truth—did the individual actually do the action for which he is accused?94 All
doubts are resolved in favor of the individual.95 The focus is on preventing

88. Id. at 731 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). See
also id. at 701 (Stevens, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 731 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
90. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Disaster: The Worst Religious Freedom Case in Fifty
Years, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2012).
91. Compare Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine,
31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1997) (describing the lack of due process in the
Ukraine), and Haibo He, The Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China, 22 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 57, 93 (2008) (stating that China does not have a tradition of due process), with
Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1211-12 (2005)
(describing the distinctive Anglo-American tradition of due process), and Belinda Wells &
Michael Burnett, When Cultures Collide: An Australian Citizen’s Power to Demand the
Death Penalty Under Islamic Law, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 19 (2000) (describing the
application of due process in South Australia and its roots in English history).
92. Betsy DeVos, Secretary’s Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement, Antonin
Scalia Law School, George Mason University (September 7, 2017).
93. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
94. See David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 473 (1992)
(“[T]he search for truth is the reason the Constitution protects the right to confrontation, the
right to compulsory process and the right to put on a defense.”).
95. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Reasonable Certainty and Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 655, 658–59 (1998).
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false convictions.96 As Blackstone noted, it is better for ten guilty men to go
free than for one innocent man to be imprisoned.97
Due process clearly applies when a public university seeks to expel
a student for disciplinary reasons,98 but the judiciary has allowed universities
to apply a less rigorous standard.99 Despite the life-altering consequences of
an expulsion,100 a state university need not transplant “wholesale . . . the rules
of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and
experience of courts.”101 Because student disciplinary hearings “are not
criminal trials, and therefore need not take on many of those formalities,”102
“neither rules of evidence nor rules of civil or criminal procedure need be
applied.”103 Indeed, as long as the student has notice of the charges, an
explanation of the evidence against him, opportunity to present his side of
the story, and the evidence is sufficient, there is no constitutional violation.104
Notice requires nothing more “than a statement of the charge against
them.”105 As to the hearing, “[c]ross-examination, the right to counsel, the

96. See Elizabeth Kaufer Busch, Sexual Assault: What’s Title IX Got To Do With It?,
PERSP. IN POL. SCI. (July 28, 1997), http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vpps20 (discussing
differences between Due Process approach and the Inquisitorial System).
97. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 (“[B]etter that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”).
98. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985). The
requirement to provide due process dates from the landmark decision in Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education. 294 F.2d 150, 158–59 (5th Cir. 1961).
99. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Flaim v. Med. Coll. of
Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 633–37 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases and analyzing the amount of
process due in student disciplinary cases).
100. See Robert B. Groholski, Comment, The Right to Representation by Counsel in
University Disciplinary Proceedings: A Denial of Due Process Law, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
739, 754–55 (1999); James M. Picozzi, Note, University Disciplinary Process: What’s Fair,
What’s Due, and What You Don’t Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132, 2138 (1987); Lisa Tenerowicz,
Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for
“Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 683 (2001).
Indeed, in some states, if the student was expelled for sexual assault, that fact is noted on the
student transcript. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:18. Given the potential liability for
admitting a known sex offender, it will be difficult for students to transfer to other
institutions. See Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls: How Sexual Assault by Football
Players Is Exposing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 617, 634–35 (2003) (explaining the liability that universities are exposed to
because of student sexual harassment and suggesting that this may make them more cautious
regarding which students they accept). In the Southeastern Conference, an athlete who is
disciplined for sexual assault is ineligible to play at any other conference school. 2016- 2017
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, Bylaw 14.1.19.
101. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
102. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635.
103. Id.; see also Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a student disciplinary hearing is not required to follow the formal rules of evidence);
Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding the
same).
104. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
105. Nash, 812 F.2d at 663.
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right to transcript, and an appellate procedure have not been constitutional
essentials, but where institutions have voluntarily provided them, courts have
often cited them as enhancers of the hearing’s fairness.”106 While accused
students have a right to consult legal counsel,107 there is no right to active
participation by attorneys.108 In short, due process requires “only that
[students] be afforded a meaningful hearing,”109 and that the decision be
supported by substantial evidence.110 As long as a public university meets the
constitutional standards, it need not follow its own internal procedures and
rules in order to satisfy its constitutional obligations.111
By itself, this judicial deference to the academy in the area of due
process raises significant constitutional concerns, but the Obama
Administration exacerbated those concerns.112 In its efforts to enforce Title

106. 2 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
§ 9.4.2.2 (4th ed. 2006).
107. Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “at most the
student has a right to get the advice of a lawyer”); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16
(1st Cir. 1988) (noting that a student is not forbidden from obtaining legal counsel before or
after the disciplinary hearing); see also Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reaffirming Osteen, 13 F.3d 221); Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948
F. Supp. 573, 582 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that procedures that afforded the student the
opportunity to consult with an attorney outside of the disciplinary hearings were adequate).
108. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily,
colleges and universities need not allow active representation by legal counsel or some other
sort of campus advocate.”); see also Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (noting that during a disciplinary
hearing, “the lawyer need not be allowed to participate in the proceeding in the usual way of
trial counsel, as by examining and cross-examining witnesses and addressing the tribunal”);
Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
student received due process, even though a practicing attorney did not conduct his defense,
because two student-lawyers consulted extensively with the student’s attorney throughout
the proceedings).
109. Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 630 (4th Cir. 2002).
110. Nash, 812 F.2d at 667-68.
111. Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
violations of federal due process are to be measured by federal standards, not by a state’s
standard); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[P]rocedural rules
created by state administrative bodies cannot, of themselves, serve as a basis for a separate
protected liberty interest.”); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329–30 (6th Cir. 1976) (“It is
not every disregard of its regulations by a public agency that gives rise to a cause of action
for violation of constitutional rights. Rather, it is only when the agency’s disregard of its
rules results in a procedure which in itself impinges upon due process rights that a federal
court should intervene in the decisional processes of state institutions.”); Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a university’s violation of its own
procedures did not amount to a violation of federal due process).
112. See K.C. JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR, JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE
ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 9-10 (2017).
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IX,113 the Obama Administration issued a “Dear Colleague Letter”114 setting
out its view of the obligations of institutions receiving federal financial
assistance under Title IX and its implementing regulations. This Dear
Colleague letter “explains that the requirements of Title IX pertaining to
sexual harassment also cover sexual violence, and lays out the specific Title
IX requirements applicable to sexual violence.”115
This Dear Colleague letter “was not adopted according to noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures; its extremely broad definition of
‘sexual harassment’ has no counterpart in federal civil rights case law; and
the procedures prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily
weighted in favor of finding guilt.”116 Specifically, the Dear Colleague
Letters (1) suggests institutions handle sexual assault cases with a single
person serving as detective, prosecutor, judge, and jury;117 (2) maintains
hearings are unnecessary; 118 (3) “implies that the school should not start the
proceedings with a presumption of innocence, or even a stance of
neutrality . . . [but with an assumption] any complaint is valid and the
accused is guilty as charged;119 (4) forbids the consideration of the
victim’s/survivor’s sexual history with anyone other than the accused
student;120 (5) discourages cross-examination;121 (6) allows an appeal of not
guilty verdicts:122 and (7) mandates a preponderance of the evidence—rather
than clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt—standard
for determining guilt.123 Although the Dear Colleague Letter has resulted in
113. Any university that receives federal funds for any purpose is subject to Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012), and its implementing
regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2015), which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational programs or activities operated by recipients of federal financial assistance.
114. See U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual
Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
On April 24, 2014, additional guidance was issued by the OCR entitled “Questions and
Answers on Title IX.” Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual
Violence (Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter OCR Questions and Answers], http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
Proposed regulations pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act were issued June
20, 2014, and final regulations were issued on October 20, 2014. Violence Against Women
Act, 34 C.F.R. § 668 (2014).
115. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 1.
116. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779–80 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
117. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114.
118. OCR Questions and Answers, supra note 114 at 25. With all due respect to the
OCR, the Constitution does not permit the “single investigator” model for public institutions.
119. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 126 (2015).
120. OCR Questions and Answers, supra note 114 at 31.
121. Id. at 30-31.
122. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 12.
123. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 11.
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an increased focus on the problems of sexual assault on campus,124 these
suggestions and mandates further undermine due process.125
II.
A.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDICIARY’S DEFERENCE TO
HIGHER EDUCATION
Racial Preferences Have Significant Cost, Frequently Do Not
Benefit Disadvantaged Students, and Are Unnecessary to the
Achievement of Racial Diversity

Although selective institutions generally view racial preferences as
having few negative consequences, little social costs, an effective means of
helping disadvantaged students, and necessary to achieving racial diversity,
there are significant reasons to doubt these conclusions.
First, at best it is debatable whether the benefits of racial preferences
outweigh the costs.126 Derek Bok and William Bowen argued racial
preferences have substantial benefits to universities and few downsides,127
but Russell K. Neili presents a very different view.128 Drawing upon
substantial social science data, Neili shows: (1) deep resentment of
preferences among Whites and Asians;129 (2) lower academic performance
among minorities who are admitted under racial preferences;130 (3) little
impact on future earnings of minorities who benefit from preferences;131 (4)
increased self-segregation by race on campuses;132 (5) no real economic
benefits to Whites and Asians that attend racially diverse institutions;133 and
(6) in the context of law schools, higher drop out and bar failure rates.134

124. When these tragic events occur, the institution has a constitutional and legal
obligation to support the victims/survivors. Reporting is going to be painful, but a university
can make it as painless as possible. Specifically, a public school must make abundant
resources available to the survivors—whether it is relocation of residence, schedule
adjustments, medical assistance, or psychological counseling. Dear Colleague Letter, supra
note 114 at 15–16. Of course, the institution must ensure the alleged perpetrator or the
alleged perpetrator’s friends and allies do not retaliate against the victim/survivor. Id. at 16.
125. BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 124.
126. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638–39
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
127. See generally DEREK BOK & WILLIAM BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998).
128. RUSSELL K. NIELI, WOUNDS THAT WILL NOT HEAL: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
OUR CONTINUING RACIAL DIVIDE (2012).
129. Id. at 172-79.
130. Id. at 163-72.
131. Id. at 143-48.
132. Id. at 186-87.
133. Id. at 215-22.
134. Id. at 222-32.
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Second, racial preferences in admissions do not necessarily help
those who are disadvantaged in contemporary society.135 “Race-based
affirmative action buys some diversity for a relative few, but not serious
inclusion,”136 but race does not, by definition, capture those who suffer the
structural disadvantages of segregated schools and neighborhoods.137 Fifty
years ago, “race and gender were appropriate markers for the type of
exclusion practiced by most predominately white universities. Today, place
is a more appropriate indicator of who gets excluded from consideration by
admissions officers at selective institutions.”138 If public institutions wish to
“help those [minority children] actually disadvantaged by [de facto]
segregation,”139 their admissions committees must acknowledge “whites who
do live in impoverished environs or attend high-poverty schools are no less
deserving of special consideration—as is anyone who is actually
disadvantaged by economic isolation.”140 Applicants from “low-opportunity
places that rise, despite the undertow, deserve special consideration from
selective schools. . . . And it should not matter what color they are or what
nation they come from.”141
Third, in many instances, racial preferences are unnecessary to the
achievement of racial diversity.142 After California banned racial preferences
through a state constitutional amendment, the University of California had
an increase in both the number of minority applicants and number of
minorities actually attending.143 In areas where many high schools are not
racially integrated, simply admitting the top students from every high school

135. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF
OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA (2014). Cashin argues preferences should emphasize:
place, rather than race, as the focus of affirmative action for the pragmatic
reason that it will foster more social cohesion and a better politics. . . . Those
who suffer the deprivations of high-poverty neighborhoods and schools are
deserving of special consideration. Those blessed to come of age in povertyfree havens are not.
Id. at xv.
136. Id. at xx.
137. Id. at xv.
138. Id. at xvi.
139. Id. at xv (emphasis omitted).
140. Id. at 79 (emphasis omitted).
141. Id. at 56.
142. As a matter of constitutional law, the judiciary must inquire “into whether a
university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.” Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). Put another way, the university must
prove there are “no workable race-neutral alternatives that would produce the educational
benefits of diversity.” Id. If there is a workable race neutral alternative, “then the University
may not consider race.” Id.
143. RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 132-33
(2012).
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can yield a significant amount of minority representation.144 If racial
minorities are a disproportionate share of the poor,145 then a socio-economic
preference has the potential to increase minority representation. 146 A similar
logic applies to first generation students—applicants who will be the first in
their families to attend college. Universities also could explore other creative
race-neutral measures—such as quotas by region of the State—that might
lead to increased minority representation. Each of these measures could
promote or insure racial diversity without utilizing racial preferences.
B.

Forcing Religious Groups to Include Non-Believers
Undermines Confident Pluralism

On many public university campuses, the aspirations of social justice
progressives conflict with the fundamental principles of classical
liberalism.147 Wishing to satisfy the often vocal social justice progressives,
university officials ignore or diminish the principles of classical liberalism. 148
Such an approach is constitutionally problematic and, ultimately, leads to
totalitarianism.149 The better approach is John Inazu’s call for a Confident
Pluralism150 that “conduces to civil peace and advances democratic
consensus-building.”151

144. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
145. Matthew Gaetner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and
Diversity 10 (U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-18,
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137126.
146. Indeed, high achieving low-income students of all races are unlikely to apply to
selective institutions. See Caroline M. Hoxby & Christopher Avery, The Missing One-Offs:
The Hidden Supply of High Achieving Low-Income Students, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 1 (Spring 2013).
147. Although some may view this as a conflict between left and right, such a
characterization is inaccurate. There are many Democrats or political liberals who embrace
the ideals of free speech, religious freedom, equal protection, and due process. Conversely,
there are some Republicans or political conservatives who reject those values and seek to
silence those who disagree.
148. See GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END
OF AMERICAN DEBATE (2012); KIRSTEN POWERS, THE SILENCING: HOW THE LEFT IS KILLING
FREE SPEECH (2015). For a review of both works, see William E. Thro, Betraying Freedom:
A Review of Lukianoff’s Unlearning Liberty and Powers’ The Silencing, 42 J. COL. & U. L.
523 (2016).
149. John D. Inazu, Law, Religion, and the Purpose of the University, WASH. U. L.
REV. (Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-02-07,
forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921506.
150. See JOHN D. INAZU, A CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016).
151. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 734 (2010) (Alito, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Gays & Lesbians for
Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 35, Christian Legal Soc’y v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-1371)).
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Expanding upon the ideas of other scholars,152 Inazu describes a
“Confident Pluralism” as “rooted in the conviction that protecting the
integrity of one’s own beliefs and normative commitments does not depend
on coercively silencing opposing views.”153 Emphasizing both an inherent
distrust of state power and a “commitment to letting differences coexist,
unless and until persuasion eliminates those differences,”154 Inazu “seeks to
maximize the spaces where dialogue and persuasion can coexist alongside
deep and intractable differences about beliefs, commitments, and ways of
life” and to “resist coercive efforts aimed at getting people to ‘fall in line’
with the majority.”155 His vision requires individuals to embrace tolerance,156
humility,157 and patience,158 but his paradigm also requires the government
to respect associational freedom,159 ensure meaningful access to public
forums,160 and provide funding to support pluralism.161
Although Americans disagree about “the purpose of our country, the
nature of the common good, and the meaning of human flourishing,”162 we
agree on the necessity of “limiting state power, of encouraging persuasion
over coercion, and of supporting a robust civil society.”163 This “modest
unity” underlying Confident Pluralism includes both a premise of inclusion
and a premise of dissent.164 The Inclusion Premise “aims for basic
membership in the political community to those within our boundaries.”165
152. In the law review article that formed the foundation for his later book, Inazu
explains:
The underpinnings of a confident pluralism are also advanced by a number of
prominent scholars. Kenneth Karst insists that “[o]ne of the points of any
freedom of association must be to let people make their own definitions of
community.” William Eskridge reaches a similar conclusion: “The state must
allow individual nomic communities to flourish or wither as they may, and the
state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the triumph of one
community over all others.” And David Richards reflects, “The best of
American constitutional law rests. . . . on the role it accords resisting voice, and
the worst on the repression of such voice.”
John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587, 590-91 (2015) (footnotes
omitted).
153. Id. at 592.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 597-98.
157. Id. at 599.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 604-06.
160. Id. at 606-08.
161. Id. at 608-12.
162. JOHN D. INAZU, A CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE 15 (2016).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 26.
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The Dissent Premise recognizes individuals “must be able to reject the norms
established by the broader political community with our own lives and
voluntary groups.”166 In order to recognize both inclusion and dissent, Inazu
calls on the broader political community to respect associational freedom, 167
ensure meaningful access to public forums,168 and provide funding to support
pluralism.169 Although our current constitutional framework requires a large
degree of associational freedom, access to public forums, and public funding,
Inazu argues that current doctrine “falls short and is headed in the wrong
direction.”170 His vision of Confident Pluralism requires the courts to
“redefine and reimagine” doctrine concerning voluntary groups, expression
in public places, and public funding of private expression.171
Allowing student religious groups to determine their own
membership is essential to Confident Pluralism.172 If the public institution
wishes to promote understanding and dynamic discussion, a policy of forced
inclusion “could be completely counterproductive, indeed nonsensical—e.g.
forcing a Jewish club to allow Muslim or Christian Officers.”173 Additionally,
as Robert George observed, “the right to religious freedom by its very nature
includes the right to leave a religious community whose convictions one no
longer shares and the right to join a different community of faith, if that is
where one’s conscience leads.”174 Forcing a religious organization to accept
those who disagree with its core tenets is to begin the process of changing
the nature of organization.175 If a Catholic organization is forced to accept
Protestants, then the organization will be less Catholic and, in time, may not
be Catholic at all. As Inazu explains, “[o]ne reason that associational freedom
is the fundamental building block of a confident pluralism is that it shields
groups and spaces from the reaches of state power. Without this initial
sorting . . . the aspirations of a confident pluralism become functionally
unworkable.”176 Put another way, Confident Pluralism requires us to
recognize that People of Faith should be able to study the Bible, Torah,
Koran, or sacred text without including secularists who reject any notion of
the divine.
166. Id. at 30.
167. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism (Article), supra note 152, at 604-06.
168. Id. at 606-08.
169. Id. at 608-12.
170. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM (Book), supra note 162, at 125.
171. Id. at 126.
172. Inazu, Confident Pluralism (Article), supra note 152, at 612-13.
173. Brief for Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 9, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) (No.
12-10); see also Brief for Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty and Christian Legal Soc’y, et
al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-11, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for
Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) (No. 12-10).
174. Robert P. George, What is Religious Freedom?, PUB. DISCOURSE, (July 24, 2013),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/07/10622.
175. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577-78 (2000).
176. Inazu, Confident Pluralism (Article), supra note 152, at 604.
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Diminished Due Process Protections Do Not Benefit the Sexual
Assault Victim-Survivors

Responding to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, public institutions
have created parallel criminal justice systems to deal with sexual assaults.177
Like other student disciplinary proceedings involving life-altering
consequences, these proceedings frequently have diminished due process
protections.178 Indeed, a campus sexual assault hearing often resembles the
Star Chamber of sixteenth and seventeenth century England.179 Thus, the
possibility of erroneous outcomes—a false conviction—increases. Yet, this
increased possibility of error has no corresponding benefit. “The notion that
a school must diminish due process rights to better serve the ‘victim’ only
creates more victims.”180
Public institutions frequently have ignored their obligations to
support the victim-survivors.181 Following the decline of the in loco parentis
doctrine, universities have tolerated a student-life culture that emphasizes
heavy drinking and casual sex.182 Such an environment does not prevent
sexual assault and, indeed, indirectly encourages it.183 When students have
come forward with allegations of sexual assault, campus officials often failed
to: (1) provide adequate psychological counseling; (2) grant
accommodations, such as changes in class schedule or housing; or (3) prevent
retaliation by the alleged perpetrator’s supporters.184 If a victim/survivor
wished to pursue justice against an alleged attacker, the university often
simply referred them to the criminal justice system, where police and
177. See Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that Title
IX sexual assault proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, Younger Abstention
should apply).
178. JOHNSON & TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 9-10, 85-116.
179. See G.J. MEYER, THE TUDORS: THE COMPLETE STORY OF ENGLAND’S MOST
NOTORIOUS DYNASTY 343-45 (2010).
180. DeVos, supra note 92.
181. See Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies
Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 387 (2014)
(stating that increased awareness of sexual assault on campuses highlights the need for
public institutions to significantly improve their procedures for responding to this problem);
Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 205, 214–17 (2011) (reviewing instances in which schools have failed to appropriately
respond to allegations of sexual assault).
182. See Oren R. Griffin, A View of Campus Safety Law in Higher Education and the
Merits of Enterprise Risk Management, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 379, 383 (2016) (noting how
students are generally treated as adult consumers and are “free to engage in various activities
at their own discretion”).
183. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY 2-5–
2-8 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (noting that substance
abuse and prior consensual sexual activity are major risk factors for sexual assault).
184. See Cantalupo, supra note 181, at 214–16 (describing instances in which
university officials failed to provide appropriate support, protection, or accommodations for
sexual assault victims, or failed to act at all).
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prosecutors would not pursue ambiguous cases.185 If the school initiated
student disciplinary proceedings, it was often a horrific experience for the
victim/survivor.186 Sadly, at some institutions, the alleged perpetrator’s status
as an athlete or the child of a wealthy donor apparently influenced the
decision to pursue discipline or the sanction involved.187
When a student makes an allegation of sexual assault, a public
institution has a constitutional, legal, and moral obligation to support the
victim-survivor.188 Reporting is going to be painful, but a university can
make it as painless as possible. Specifically, a public school must make
abundant resources available to the survivors—whether it is relocation of
residence, schedule adjustments, medical assistance, or psychological
counseling.189 Of course, the institution must ensure the alleged perpetrator
or the alleged perpetrator’s friends and allies do not retaliate against the
victim/survivor.190
The institution has these obligations regardless of any uncertainties
or ambiguities about the case. A student who sincerely believes she was
sexually assaulted is going to manifest the trauma of a rape victim-survivor
even though the alleged perpetrator may claim innocence or the evidence is
at best inconclusive. The student must receive counseling and
accommodation regardless of whether the institution successfully pursues
disciplinary action.
These obligations are in addition to—not in place of—the
obligations to the individual accused of the sexual assault. Fulfilling the
institutional obligations to the victim/survivor will not harm the accused.
Diminishing the due process protections for the accused will not help the
victim-survivor.
III.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
HIGHER EDUCATION

If academic administrators are no more angelic than other
constitutional actors are, then their actions should receive doubt, not
deference. Ending the deference to higher education and, thus, restoring the
constitutional symmetry is possible. Such an effort must focus on state law,

185. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to
Peer Sexual Violence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 489–90 n.28 (2012) (noting that many
institutions’ sexual assault reporting guidelines emphasize contacting police).
186. Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads, supra note 181, at 214–16.
187. BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 123.
188. As part of its constitutional obligations under the Equal Protection Clause, a public
institution should encourage victims/survivors to report the acts against them to the police
and should support the student after the report. However, the OCR guidance takes a different
view. Id. at 124–25.
189. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 15–16.
190. Id. at 16.
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federal statutory or regulatory changes, and, ultimately, overruling or
limiting Supreme Court precedents.
A.

Treat Racial Preferences in Higher Education in the Same
Manner as Racial Preferences in Other Contexts

In the context of racial preferences, higher education officials have
two advantages over other constitutional actors. First, university officials
have the option of using the educational benefits of a diverse student body as
a compelling governmental interest.191 Second, when they choose to pursue
this interest, public university administrators receive far greater deference on
both the need to pursue the objective and the means of achieving that
objective.192 Although there are serious doubts that racial preferences
actually increase minority enrollments at selective private institutions or at
flagship state universities, both racial diversity and the use of racial
preferences to achieve diversity are sacrosanct in higher education.193 If
either advantage were eliminated, university leaders would become
apoplectic. Yet, there are reasons to believe that such a paradigm will be
legal, if not constitutional, reality.
First, the People of individual states may well adopt state
constitutional provisions mandating an end to racial preferences.194 In Schutte
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, & Immigrant Rights
& Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 195 the Court rejected a federal
constitutional challenge to such measures.196 As the public continues to doubt
both the wisdom of university officials and the efficacy of racial preferences,
other states may see similar measures.
Second, the Supreme Court may well reverse itself on the issue of
whether obtaining educational benefits of diversity is a compelling
governmental interest. Three current Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito—have expressed, at least implicitly, their
disapproval of diversity as a compelling governmental interest.197 Although
191. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Part I(A).
193. See Jeremy Ashkenas, Haeyoun Park, & Amam Pearce, Even With Affirmative
Action, Blacks and Hispanics Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than 35 Years
Ago, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2w0BE08.
194. The People of Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, and Washington have amended their State Constitutions to ban racial preferences
in university admissions. See Ariz. Const. art. 1, § 36; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 31; Fla. Const. art.
1, § 2; Mich. Const. art. 1, § 26; Neb. Const. art I, § 30; N.H. Const. part 1, art. 2.; Okla.
Const. art. 2, § 36A; and Wash. Const. art. 9, § 1.
195. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
196. Id. at 1636-37.
197. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 72533, (2007) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., announcing the judgment
of the Court); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-48 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at
352-54 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Gorsuch has not addressed the issue as either a Justice or a Tenth
Circuit judge, the similarities between his judicial philosophy and Justice
Scalia’s judicial philosophy suggest he may reject diversity as a compelling
governmental interest.198 If the three Justices opposed to diversity remain
consistent, if Justice Gorsuch is opposed to diversity as a compelling interest,
and if one of the four pro-diversity Justices retires and is replaced by a Justice
opposed to diversity, then the diversity rationale is doomed. Given three prodiversity Justices are over seventy-nine and given all three embrace diversity
as a compelling governmental interest, it seems quite likely that a prodiversity justice will leave the Court before the 2020 election.
Third, even if the Court preserves diversity as a compelling
governmental interest, the Court may well apply less deference to higher
education officials’ efforts to achieve diversity. In other words, the narrow
tailoring inquiry may actually have teeth. Although Justice Kennedy has
accepted diversity as compelling governmental interest, he generally was
skeptical of the means to achieve the end.199 Indeed, in Fisher I, Justice
Kennedy—writing for the Court—deferred to university judgment as to
whether to pursue diversity,200 but refused to find that university officials
were entitled to no deference as to the means of achieving that end.201
Although Justice Kennedy—again writing for the Court—was far more
deferential to the administrators in Fisher II,202 he emphasized the
“University’s program is sui generis.”203 In a future case involving a
university program that is not inherently unique, Justice Kennedy—and the
four Justices opposed to diversity—may well return to the non-deferential
approach of Fisher I.
B.

Student Religious Organizations May Define Their Own
Membership

In the context of student religious groups, university administrators
are allowed to do something that no other constitutional actor can do—force
a religious organization to admit persons who reject fundamental tenets of
the faith. Yet, there are several reasons to think public university
administrators may face new limitations.
First, in some states, state law may protect the rights of student
religious groups. Because state constitutions often are more protective of

198. See Eric Citron, Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13,
2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neilgorsuch/.
199. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
201. Id. at 2420.
202. See Peter N. Kirasnow, Race Discrimination Rationalized Again, 2015-16 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 59, 63-85 (2016).
203. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).
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individual liberty,204 a student group may have a state constitutional right to
exclude those who disagree with the group’s views. 205 Indeed, since the
Burger Court’s decisions prompted a revival of state constitutional law in the
early 1970’s,206 “it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state
constitutional questions.”207 Although the issue apparently is one of national
first impression, it would not be surprising if a state court determined that its
state constitution prohibited the government from indirectly forcing an
organization to admit members who disagreed with the organization’s
objectives.208 Moreover, state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts209
prohibit government from imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion unless there is a compelling governmental interest pursued
through the least restrictive means.210 To the extent that a student group’s
position is the result of religious belief, these state laws seem to prohibit
government from indirectly forcing the inclusion of dissenters. Furthermore,
in two some states, there are specific state statutes guaranteeing the right of
religious groups to exclude those who do not embrace the faith.211
Second, the Court may well overrule Christian Legal Society. Two
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Hosanna-Tabor and Alliance for Open
204. A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING
ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 1, 14 (1988).
205. State constitutions are fundamentally different from the National Constitution—
the National Constitution is a grant of power and the state constitutions are limitations on
power. See Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1983); Bd. of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n. 5 (N.Y. 1982). Thus, the presumptions concerning
legislative authority are reversed. Congress may not act unless it can identify a specific
enumerated power. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). But, the state legislature
may act unless there is an explicit restriction. See Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm’n, 756 A.2d
186, 196 (R.I. 2000).
206. See generally A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
207. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
208. Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court diminished religious freedom in Smith,
several state courts held that the State Constitutions provided greater protection for religious
freedom. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of Allegiance, And
Religious Liberty: Avoiding The Extremes, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211-12 (2004)
(discussing cases).
209. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§41-14933–1493.02 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§52-571b (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§761.01-.05 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE §§73-401–
404 (2017); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (LexisNexis 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 446.350 (West 2017); MO. STAT. §§1.302-.307 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§28-22-1 to 2822-5 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 51, §§251-258 (West 2017); 71 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§2401-2407 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§42-80.1-1–4 (2006); S.C.
CODE §§1-32-10–60 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§110.001-.012 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63l-5-101–403 (LexisNexis
2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1–2.02 (2009).
210. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 497 (2010); James W. Wright, Jr., Making State Religious
Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425, 426 (2010).
211. See KY. REV. STAT. § 164.348(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-400.
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Society collectively undermine the result in Christian Legal Society.212 The
first, Hosanna-Tabor, establishes that religious groups have a right of
religious autonomy—absolute discretion to determine whom its leaders will
be.213 Logically, if an organization can restrict its leadership to those who
adhere to the faith, then the organization ought to be able to impose a similar
requirement on membership. That is the opposite result of Christian Legal
Society. The second, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for
Open Society International, Inc.,214 represents a revival and redefinition of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—government may impose
conditions that define the program, but may not impose conditions that reach
outside the program. As a result, government cannot force a religious group
to surrender its religious autonomy rights as a condition of receiving some
government subsidy or benefit—such as university recognition or access to
student activity funds.215 That outcome also is the direct opposite of Christian
Legal Society. In sum, Hosanna-Tabor and Alliance for Open Society
collectively contradict the result in Christian Legal Society.216
Third, even if the Court does not overrule Christian Legal Society, it
may limit the holding to circumstances where all student groups must admit
all students. Some Universities allow political groups to exclude those who
disagree with the groups’ objectives, but force religious groups to admit
everyone. 217 Such a policy requires religious groups to be treated differently
than secular organizations. In Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, the Court
held that government could not treat religious organizations differently from
secular organizations.218 That holding requires universities to treat student
religious organizations in the same manner as student secular
organizations.219

212. See William E. Thro, The Limits of Christian Legal Society, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 124 (2014); William E. Thro, Undermining Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 295
ED. L. REP. 867 (2013).
213. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012).
214. 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
215. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: FEDERAL LAW PROTECTIONS FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY at 3 (Oct. 6, 2017) (discussing interaction between Alliance for Open
Society and Hosanna-Tabor).
216. To be sure, Christian Legal Society remains the controlling constitutional rule until
explicitly overruled. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997). “At most, HosannaTabor and Alliance for Open Society cast serious doubt on the reasoning of Christian Legal
Society and provide the basis for asking the Court to overrule Christian Legal Society.
217. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011)
(upholding such a policy).
218. 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021-22 (2017).
219. This analysis is limited to discrimination based upon belief and does not apply to
discrimination based on race or sex. If a public institution required all student organizations
to refrain from race or sex discrimination, then, under the reasoning of Christian Legal
Society, the institution would not violate the federal constitution.
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Enhanced Due Process Protections for Life-Altering
Disciplinary Proceedings

Given the potentially life-altering consequences of a Title IX sexual
assault proceeding, there is a need for enhanced due process protections.
These enhanced protections involve three critical elements: (1) strict
separation of roles; (2) a hearing focused on a search for the truth; and (3) a
standard of proof that is high enough to prevent wrongful convictions. Each
of these is detailed below.
First, the institutions must strictly separate the investigative,
prosecutorial, adjudicative, and appellate functions. America’s criminal
justice system acknowledges the possibility that individuals may abuse their
power; it disperses authority among multiple individuals and contains
structural safeguards to prevent abuse of power.220 A prosecutor must obtain
a grand jury indictment or preliminary hearing finding of probable cause.221
A single juror can prevent a finding of guilt.222 A guilty verdict, but not an
acquittal, is subject to appellate review.223 The authority to imprison an
individual is never concentrated in an individual.224 While neither our
constitutional system nor our criminal justice system operates perfectly,
avoiding concentrations of power and authority makes it more likely that
society, rather than a faction,225 will prevail and only the guilty will go to jail.
The same principles must apply when a public university confronts
an allegation that could result in expulsion. The individuals who investigate
the allegation must not be involved in the decision to prosecute, the
determination of guilt, or the appellate review. The individuals who
determine whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings or whether to
negotiate some sort of “plea bargain” must not be involved in the
investigation or the adjudication of guilt.226 The individuals who determine
whether the student is, in fact, guilty must not be involved with the
investigative phase, the decision to charge, or the appellate review. The
220. See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth
Amendment in a Real Offense Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J.
725, 758 (2006) (describing the separate roles given to the judge and the jury); James
Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 656
(1976) (discussing different procedural safeguards in our criminal justice system).
221. Thirty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: 2010, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 223, 239, 247 (2010).
222. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (holding that there is a constitutional
right to a unanimous jury if the jury only has six members).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
224. See Ross, supra note 220, at 758–59 (noting that the judge and jury have different
functions so that one entity does not have all the power).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
226. Moreover, the accused individual should have the right to offer a rebuttal to the
investigative report. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON COLLEGE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND VICTIM PROTECTIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES IN RESOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2017).
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appellate panel must have not be involved in the investigation, prosecution,
or hearing and, more importantly, should have the right to reverse on any
legal or factual ground.227
Second, the hearing must be a search for the truth of guilt or
innocence. The accused individual must have access to an attorney and the
attorney must be able to actively participate.228 Additionally, in order to
ensure the correct result, the accused student must have access to all
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.229 There should be no surprises at the
hearing.230 Because the student is presumed innocent, the institution has the
burden of proving guilt.231 Since “[c]ross-examination is the principal means
227. Many institutions limit appeals to specific grounds, such as the discovery of new
information. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Nancy Gertner, Janet Halley & Jeannie Suk
Gersen, Fairness For All Students Under Title IX, DIGITAL ACCESS FOR STUDENTS AT
HARVARD (Aug. 21, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/
Fairness%20for%20All%20Students.pdf.
228. While a public university is not required to provide an attorney for a student
accused of sexual assault, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 25
(1981), the institution cannot prohibit the student from seeking legal counsel. Osteen v.
Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “at most the student has a right to get
the advice of a lawyer”); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that
a student is not forbidden from obtaining legal counsel before or after the disciplinary
hearing); see Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reaffirming
Osteen); Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 582 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting
that procedures that afforded the student the opportunity to consult with an attorney outside
of the disciplinary hearings were adequate). Nor can the university prohibit an attorney from
being present at the hearing and offering advice as a passive participant. Cf. Osteen, 13 F.3d
at 225 (holding that when the student may also face criminal charges, “it is at least arguable
that the due process clause entitles him to consult a lawyer, who might for example advise
him to plead the Fifth Amendment”); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 107 (1st Cir.
1978) (holding that when criminal charges are also pending, a student must be allowed to
have an attorney present during the disciplinary hearings to provide advice, but the attorney
does not have to actively participate in the student’s defense).
229. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1210–11 (2000) (stating that criminal procedural rules require the
government to produce all material and exculpatory evidence upon request). Schools should
apply the same rules to disciplinary proceedings.
230. While this proposition may seem obvious, it presents special problems in the
context of the victim’s previous sexual history. “Over the last few decades, almost all
American courts have limited the extent to which accused rapists can bring in the sexual past
of an alleged victim. This ensures that rape trials are not in effect also putting the victim on
trial.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 125 (stating that public universities must follow the
same approach as the federal rules of evidence FED. R. EVID. 412 or applicable state law.).
See also Pamela J. Fisher, State v. Alvey: Iowa’s Victimization of Defendants Through the
Overextension of Iowa’s Rape Shield Law, 76 IOWA L. REV. 835, 835 (collecting rape shield
laws from most states).
231. See Barton L. Ingraham, The Right to Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the
Burden of Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O’Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 559, 562–63 (1996) (noting that although the prosecution in a criminal case
has the burden to prove all the elements of the crime charged, the defendant in a criminal
case has no burden of proof).
Although some insist victims/survivors have “procedural equality,” Nancy Chi
Cantalupo, Address: The Civil Rights Approach to Campus Sexual Violence, 28 REGENT U.
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by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested,”232 there must be some form of cross-examination.233 As a further
safeguard against wrongful convictions, any finding of guilt should be
unanimous.234 Finally, there should be no appellate review of a “not guilty”
verdict.235
Third, the standard of proof must be high enough to avoid wrongful
convictions. In the criminal justice system, a conviction for sexual assault
requires the prosecution to prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt (99% certainty).236 However, if a student disciplinary
system uses a lesser standard, such as clear and convincing evidence (75%),
or, as the OCR guidance mandates, a mere preponderance of the evidence
(50.01%),237 then the likelihood that an innocent person will be found guilty
increases dramatically.238 In order to minimize the possibility of false
convictions, institutions should be required to utilize a clear and convincing
evidence standard or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.239
This vision of enhanced due process is an aspiration, but there are
reasons to believe it may soon be a reality.
First, the Trump Administration has rescinded the Obama
Administration’s Dear Colleague Letter240 and announced its intention to
promulgate regulations promulgated through “a transparent notice and
L. REV. 185, 193 (2016), the governmental actor cannot transfer its responsibilities to a
private individual. The matter is not Victim/Survivor v. Alleged Perpetrator; the matter is
Public University v. Alleged Perpetrator. It is the public university that has the constitutional
and legal obligation to remedy known incidents of sex discrimination, including sexual
assault. It is the alleged perpetrator who violated the university’s rules.
232. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
233. Although trial attorneys strive to perfect the technique of leading questions, the
veracity and accuracy of a witness’s testimony can be questioned and refuted without
leading questions. Instead, cross-examination can take place through the hearing officer or
by requiring advocates to ask more open-ended questions.
234. Cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (holding that there is a
constitutional right to a unanimous jury if the jury only has six members).
235. The Dear Colleague Letter required that victim/survivors be able to appeal a not
guilty verdict. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114 at 11.
236. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (stating that the Constitution
requires application of the reasonable doubt standard for all criminal convictions).
237. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 11.
238. See John Villasenor, Probabilistic Framework for Modeling False Title IX
“Convictions” Under the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 15 L., PROBABILITY, &
RISK 223 (2016).
239. To be sure, as I explained elsewhere, under current due process jurisprudence, it is
possible to provide due process while utilizing the preponderance of the evidence standard.
See William E. Thro, No Clash of Constitutional Values: Respecting Freedom & Equality in
Public University Sexual Assault Cases, 28 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 197, 209 (2016). My point is
that the existing due process jurisprudence should change for proceedings with potentially
life altering consequences.
240. See U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22,
2017), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USED/bulletins/1b8ba66 (announcing the
withdrawal of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter).
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comment process to incorporate the insights of all parties in developing a
better way.”241 Declaring “the era of ‘rule by letter’ is over,”242 the Secretary
of Education called for a new paradigm where “[e]very survivor of sexual
assault must be taken seriously. Every student accused of sexual misconduct
must know that guilt is not predetermined.”243 In the interim, the Department
of Education issued a new question and answer guidance, which provides far
greater flexibility than the Obama Administration’s Dear Colleague Letter.244
While any new regulations implementing Title IX will be limited to the
context of Title IX sexual assault proceedings, the enhanced due process
measures in one context likely will lead to similar measures in other contexts
involving life altering events.
Second, when confronted with due process claims in the Title IX
Sexual Assault context, the courts are showing less deference to university
officials.245 In a case involving Younger abstention,246 the Sixth Circuit has
found Title IX sexual assault proceedings to be “akin to criminal
prosecution.”247 In cases where the credibility of the Complaining Witness is
at issue, the Sixth Circuit held that the Complaining Witness must be visible
and audible to the fact finder and must be subjected to some form of crossexamination.248 Taken together, the two Sixth Circuit decisions suggest a far
less deferential attitude toward university administrators and university
procedures.
CONCLUSION
Public university administrators are not angels; they are human
beings. Like all human beings, they “have sinned and fall short of the glory
of God.”249 Like all human beings, have they unconscious biases that color
their attitudes and reactions to others.250 University officials have laudable
241. DeVos, supra note 92.
242. Id. at 3.
243. Id. at 4.
244. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., Q & A ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (Sept.
2017).
245. K.C. Johnson has identified sixty-seven cases where the courts have denied a
university’s motion to dismiss. See Complaints and Lawsuits, SAVE (Sept. 20, 2017)
http://www.saveservices.org/sexual-assault/complaints-and-lawsuits/.
246. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“This underlying reason for
restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an
even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.”).
247. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2017).
248. See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 402-04 (6th Cir. 2017).
249. Romans 3:23 (English Standard Version).
250. HOWARD J. ROSS, EVERYDAY BIAS: IDENTIFYING AND NAVIGATING UNCONSCIOUS
JUDGMENTS IN OUR DAILY LIVES 3–4 (2014) (arguing that all humans are fraught with bias).
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ends—achieving racial diversity, making the LGTBQ community feel
welcome and included, and supporting the victim-survivors of sexual assault.
In their pursuit of these ends, they use constitutionally dubious means. They
engage in the “sordid business” of racial sorting,251 deny the Constitution’s
“special solicitude” toward religion,252 and employ “shameful” procedures
“wholly un-American and . . . anathema to the system of governance to
which our Founders pledged their lives over two hundred years ago.”253
Although the judiciary vigorously enforces constitutional limitations
in non-higher education contexts, when confronted with claims from
academe, the judiciary abdicates and defers. The courts never tolerate racial
classifications except when university administrators pursue them. Religious
organizations enjoy absolute autonomy except when their members are
students.254 Civil and criminal courts respect due process, but campus
disciplinary proceedings—which have life changing consequences—
disregard the principles of Magna Carta.255
This judicial deference must end. A Republic “conceived in liberty”
and “dedicated to the proposition that all . . . are created equal”256 cannot
tolerate higher education administrators betraying these principles.
Fortunately, the Constitution’s Calvinist features allow for correction.
Because the Constitution divides sovereignty between the States and the
National Government, the State can impose limitations where the federal
judiciary does not.257 Exercising its enumerated powers in the space between
what the Constitution prohibits and what the Constitution requires, the
National Government—through statutes or regulations—may limit the
discretion of higher education. Where previous decisions depart from the
original public meaning or a construction consistent with original public
meaning, the Supreme Court can—and should—overrule its previous
interpretation.258

251. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012).
253. DeVos, supra note 92.
254. Compare Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189 with Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez,
561 U.S. 661, 687-98 (2010).
255. CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS & MYTHS 28-29 (2010).
256. Abraham Lincoln, GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (Nov. 19, 1863).
257. See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013).
258. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“A constitutional interpretation that is wrong should not stand.”).
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